... Regarding your comment about my essay: your argument of the periodic
famines in the Russian countryside is very strong and persuasive! As for the
collectivization of the agriculture, I agree with you that it was the
precondition for victory in WW2. (I have expressed this opinion in my
Stalin-book). But I cannot define as a triumph a terrible civil war, that
implied the disappearing of every rule of law and made the very large, arbitrary
killing by Ezov possible. Only in this sense I speak of «horror» (as you have
written, Stalin himself spoke of a «fearful» period). Sometimes history is
tragic: in its last stage the struggle of Toussaint Louverture was a racial war
and in this sense was horrible, but at the same time this struggle was a great
step to emancipation of the black people and of the mankind.
Best, Domenico Losurdo
Dear Professor Losurdo:
Here are my thoughts on your exchange with
Nicolas Werth.
I’ll begin with Werth. He is an inveterant
anticommunist. I have caught him in one or two blatant lies, though not in this
exchange with you.
In my opinion, Werth’s intervention here
rests on some misconceptions, no doubt deliberate ones:
* Werth refers to “the archives”, and
especially to the 7-volume series on the “Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside”,
as though their existence resolved anything. It doesn’t.
I have possessed a copy of this 7-volume
work since it was published. It is a useful compilation of primary documents.
But documents, in themselves, prove nothing, and the same is true of this
collection.
* Werth refers repeatedly to “the
peasants.” There was no such group. The Russian (and Ukrainian, etc.) peasantry
was sharply differentiated. For example, a huge number had no land at all.
Another large number had very small parcels of land. They were called “batraki”
(the landless) and “bedniaki” (the poor, either landless or with very little
land).
These peasants lost nothing by entering
kolkhozes or sovkhozes. So the notion that collectivization was a “war against
the peasantry” is a smokescreen.
* Collectivization did not cause the famine
of 1932-33. That was caused by bad weather conditions. Both Davies and
Wheatcroft and Mark Tauger – the greatest scholars in the West on this subject
– agree here. Tauger believes that Davies and Wheatcroft exaggerate the extent
to which collectivization was one of several primary causes, and attributes the
famine primarily to bad weather.
* Collectiviation was a great success in
that it stopped the periodic famines that had plagued Russia (including
Ukraine) every 3-4 years for a millennium. The famine of 1932-33 was the very
last such famine – except for that of 1946-47. Wheatcroft has recently argued
that this was caused by catastrophic weather conditions and not by Soviet government
mismanagement.
Viewed in this light, collectivization in
the USSR was one of the greatest feats of social reform of the 20th
century, alongside the industrialization of the USSR. It saved millions of
lives that would have been lost in future famines, which would have continued
to recur with regularity.
Of course, it also enabled
industrialization and victory in WW2. That was no small accomplishment. But
even setting this aside, collectivization stopped the endless cycle of famines,
saving millions.
In addition, one must say this: those whom
the famine of 1932-33 killed were from all classes of the peasantry, the rich
as well as the poor. In previous famines, rich peasants had thrived, merchants
had hoarded grain for higher prices, and only the poor had starved. This, no
doubt, is one of the reasons collectivization is so hated by Werth and
reactionaries generally: it removed the privilege of the rich and protected the
poor.
Bukharin’s plan could not possibly have
permitted industrialization, and therefore would have meant that the Nazis
would have won the war. In addition, the capitalist elements in the countryside
were growing rapidly under the NEP. This would have continued.Incidentally,
Trotsky’s plan was the same as Bukharin’s here.
* Werth refers to the “massive importation
of American grain” in the ‘70s and ‘80s. So what? Collectivization stopped
periodic starvation, as it was supposed to do. See the famous quotation from
Stalin, as he talked to Winston Churchill.
In a famous
passage in his memoir of World War II, Hinge of Fate, Churchill quoted Stalin
as saying:
“Ten million,”
he said, holding up his hands. “It was fearful. Four years it lasted. It was
absolutely necessary for Russia, if we
were to avoid periodic famines, to plough the land with tractors.”
I quote this passage in a short article
here:
Russia and the Ukraine are far more
northerly than is the USA. The point is that, having industrialized, the USSR
could pay for the importation of grain when necessary. Collectivization allowed
for industrialization and stopped the cycle of famines.
* Werth is completely wrong about the “mass
murders of 1937-1938.” These were not in the least a “prophylactic cleansing” –
though this explanation is the one being promoted now by anticommunists
generally.
I’ve done a lot of research on this and
intend to write a book on it in the future. For now, see my article here:
"The Moscow Trials and the "Great
Terror" of 1937-1938: What the Evidence Shows."–
Here I have included links to all the
interrogations of Ezhov that have been made public, along with translations of
them into English, as well as to some other interrogations. They are very
enlightening.
In a recent volume of documents on
1937-1938 (in Russian) t Khaustov, an inveterate anticommunist, concedes that
Stalin believed the reports Ezhov was sending him about bands of rebels and
oppositionists. Arch Getty showed a decade ago that Ezhov murdered far more
people than the Politburo ever contemplated. It was Ezhov, not Stalin and the
PB, that set “quotas” for arrests and executions. Stalin and the PB had called
for “limits.”
* The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has been
demonized by the anticommunists and crypto-Nazis in Eastern Europe, aided by
their allies elsewhere. But they have it completely wrong.
+ Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia
were colonial possessions of Poland, obtained by conquest from Soviet Russia in
1921 and then “settled” by Polish “settlers” (osadniki), largely former
military officers, in order to “Polonize” them.
+ Ukrainians and Belorussians were a
majority in these areas but Poland progressively took away their rights to use
of their languages, to schooling in those languages, to government employment,
and in general discriminated against them in many ways.
+ The large Jewish population of these
areas was similarly subject to official discrimination.
+ Poland added to this imperialist conquest
when it took the Teszczin area way from Czechoslovakia at the time of the
Munich sell-out in 1938.
+ Finally (for now): The Soviets did not
send in the Red Army until September 17, 1939, after the Germans had informed
them that, in their view, Poland as a state no longer existed. This meant that
Germany would not abide by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact division of spheres of
influence. The Germans officially warned the Soviets that “new states” – i.e.,
a pro-Nazi Ukrainian Nationalist state – would arise in W. Ukraine and W.
Belorussia if the Red Army did not come in.
+ The Germans were, in fact, correct –
Poland as a state had ceased to exist when its government, along with its
military leadership, interned itself in Rumania on September 17 1939.
I have a long article, with 17 or 18 web
pages of evidence, on this question at
The article is the first link on the left.
All the other pages are evidence.
Note that Winston Churchill agreed with the
Soviet incursion into what had formerly been Eastern Poland.
The Germans almost seized Moscow and
Leningrad as it was! If the USSR had not entered former Eastern Poland, the
Wehrmacht would have started its invasion much closer to the Soviet heartland
than it did and most likely captured Leningrad and Moscow.
To sum up:
* The “Danilov volumes” prove nothing,
though they are useful as any collection of documents is useful;
* The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was not only
salutary, but essential. Far from a crime or an “invasion”, the USSR acted as
any state would have done in entering Western Poland to keep the Wehrmacht as
far as possible from its pre-1939 borders.
* Collectivization was a success in ending
the endless cycle of famines and in permitting industrialization.
* Collectivization did not cause the
famine. No doubt the famine would have been less severe if it had not coincided
with collectivization. But that was almost sure to happen anyway. The main
thing is: This famine was the LAST famine.
* The “Terror” – really, the Ezhovshchina –
of 1937-1938 was the result of Ezhov’s conspiracy, along with that of some of
the First Secretaries. Of course it was horrible. But Stalin and the PB did not
undertake it.
I should mention here that, in my
Russian-only book (with my Moscow colleague Vladimir Bobrov) I have an essay in
which I show that Bukharin knew about Ezhov’s conspiracy but did not mention it
in his interrogations or at trial. If Bukharin, Rykov, et al. had done this,
Ezhov could have been stopped and the mass murders either avoided or curtailed.
Bukharin’s, and the Right’s, responsibility for Ezhov’s mass murders has not
been pointed out elsewhere.
When you read the MS of my Kirov book you
will note that we have much evidence that the conspiracies alleged in the three
public Moscow Trials, plus the Tukhachevsky trial, did exist – they were not at
all “fabrications” by Stalin or anyone else.
As for your own contribution, I must be
honest: I find it to be excellent!
You have certainly made arguments that I
have not encountered elsewhere, and certainly have not thought of myself.
I would like to translate it into English
and circulate it – that is, if you agree.
Also, do you have a version in Italian? I
would like to send it to some friends in Italy.
I like very much your response about the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: “s’il y a course au
compromis avec Hitler, Stalinel’aperdue”.
Imagine anyone objecting to the Soviets signing the M-R Pact in the face of
Munich!
I would only add that the M-R Paact was not
only defensible – it was essential, and quite probably saved the USSR, and
thereby all of us, from defeat in the war.
That said, there are a few points where I
would disagree with you somewhat. They all boil down to this: In my view, you
cede too much to Werth, every single one of whose claims is false.
Trotsky, for example. All the evidence we
now possess points to Trotsky’s having been guilty of all the charges made
against him in the Moscow Trials. This includes a good deal of evidence from
the Trotsky Archives at Harvard and at the Hoover Institution, as discovered by
Pierre Broué, a famous Trotskyist.
I would disagree that collectivization was
“La période la plus horrible estcelle de la collectivisation del’agriculture.”
As I stated above, in my view it was a triumph.
Naturaly the Bolsheviks made many errors in
carrying it out. They were the first; it had never been done. Pioneers always
make errors; in fact it is impossible to be an innovator without making errors.
The Chinese and North Vietnamese learned
from these errors, and carried out collectivization in different ways. The end
result was, I think, fewer casualties. But they had the Soviet example to learn
from.
For “most horrible” I’d vote for the
Ezhovshchina – which, as I have argued above, Werth and all the other
anticommunists falsify. Werth has absolutely no evidence that it was an attempt
at “nettoyageprophylactique” – this is just verbiage. It was a disaster, of
course, but a disaster for which Bukharin, so sacred to the anticommunists and
to Khrushchev in his day, bears significant responsibility.
I do not agree that “the Stalin period” was
a “horror”. I think you do not really agree either.
But of course it was tragic, in that errors
were made that led to socialism being sidetracked, and then betrayed
altogether. It led to Khrushchev – and Khrushchev and his ilk were nourished
during the Stalin period. Therefore, obviously, reactionary developments were
taking place. We need to study to discover what they were.
But in sum, I think your essay is
excellent! I know that Werth will not accept a word of it.
So much the worse for him. His father,
Alexander Werth, was an honest observer, in my estimation, and his books are
well worth reading today, all of them. Nicolas Werth’s are what I call
“propaganda with footnotes.”
My apologies for writing at such length.
1 commento:
¡Estimado Losurdo !,creo que la crítica de Grover Furr es excelente y fundamentada en la evidencia primaria.
La lectura de las declaraciones de Yezhov y los nuevos documentos aportados por Khaustov,son iluminadores de la situación de ese periodo.
Este análisis rompe con otras visones de izquierda que son susgestivas pero que no están sustentadas en una evidencia fehaciente, como es el caso de Philip Panaggio.
http://redcomrades.byethost5.com/redcomrades/chap1.html
Los horrores de la guerra civil y de la Yezovschina hay que ponerlos en el debe de los elementos "occidentalistas" que operaban dentro del estado soviético en connivencia con potencias como Alemania,Polonia y no descartemos a Gran Bretaña y francia.
De hecho la "yezhovschina" tiene elementos de analogía con otras intervenciones occidentales y los resultados mortíferos a los que dieron lugar como los sucesos de Camboya en 1975-78.
Cómo mucho, a stalin y su grupo, cabría imputarles es el insuficiente celo en la vigilancia de Yezhov("culpa in vigilando");pero ya se sabe que a veces la relación entre los gobiernos y sus organos de seguridad nunca es fácil, más aún en una situación terrible de "guerra no declarada"(guerra fría) desde el exterior.
Un Saludo,Rafael Granados.España.
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